Reliance[1]

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1. Introduction

Political philosophers, moral theorists and legal theorists have long empha-sized the fragility of our agency—how chance can render our best-laid plans into little more than inert fantasies. This fragility is not due to weakness of will. Rather, it is due to the fact that each of us must rely upon forces beyond our control—and just as often forces beyond our comprehension—in order for our plans to be successful. This *fact of reliance*—the fact of the deep significance of reliance in our lives—is a central theme of Thomas Hobbes' argument that in the state of nature, where it is irrational to rely upon others to keep their covenants, there is infamously "no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society . . . and the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."[2] More recently, Rawls' defense of the difference principle is, at least in part, based upon the recognition that each person relies upon other per-sons in a reciprocal cooperative scheme for the provision of primary goods.[3] Political philosophers are not the only ones alive (or criticizably blind) to the fact of reliance: in ethics, reliance is at the heart of a leading theory of promising,[4] and plays the central role in highly influential theories of trust;[5] moral philosophers have for a generation been acutely aware of the threat of so-called moral luck, i.e., the way in which we rely on factors beyond our control to determine the moral valence of our actions;[6] in jurisprudence, the concept of reliance damages is a core concept in the theory of contracts;[7] and finally, ancient thinkers were deeply sensitive to the fact of reliance, as we can see, for example, in Aristotle's argument that *eudaimonia* requires good training by others when young and good luck when old.[8] From political theory to ethics to law, the fact of reliance is recognized as a crucial feature of human life.

Epistemologists, philosophers of mind, and philosophers of action, on the other hand, have not been so acutely sensitive to the fact of reliance and therefore have not offered any distinctive accounts of reliance as a psychological attitude.[9] This is unjustifiable. Reliance is surely more than just a long-shot candidate psychological state to be attended to only once we've cleared up other matters having to do with more central attitudes such as knowledge and belief. For, just as the ethical, political and legal significance of other psychological states such as desire, intention and knowledge merits the attention of, for example, philosophers of mind, so ought reliance to be treated as a significant mental attitude in its own right.[10] In this paper, I aim to give reliance this well-deserved treatment. In turn, the conclusions I reach may have significant consequences for those elements of moral, political and legal theory that employ the concept of reliance.

I defend two theses, one negative and the other positive. The negative thesis is a rejection of any theory of reliance that reduces reliance either to a single belief or Michael Bratman's acceptance in a practical context.[11] The positive thesis reflects (but does not argue from) the facts (i) that the concept of reliance is, as I've pointed above, at play in many different arenas, and (ii) that this suggests that there is some equivocation or ambiguity in how we use this concept that is so central to so many of our moral and political theories. Thus, I argue that there are two kinds of reliance, namely an "internal" form and an "external" form.[12] External reliance is a relation that exists between the agent and the world and so is not a psychological state. Internal reliance is a credal-conative attitude or suite of attitudes that involves both regarding some proposition as true and having a practical commitment or reflectively endorsed pro-attitude towards to a certain state of affairs (since nothing turns on it, I shall take no position on whether reliance can be cleanly reduced to a suite of attitudes or is its own *sui generis* psychological attitude). This credal-conative attitude or suite of attitudes is the psychological state that mediates (i) an agent's theoretical beliefs about the world (let us call this her *theory of the world*); (ii) her conception of her agency with respect to this theory of the world; and (iii) her ends as she understands them. The internal form of reliance is, in short, the (suite of) psychological attitude(s) that captures one's senses both of oneself as an agent embedded in a determinate world and of both the internal and external limits of one's own agential capacities.[13] Having identified these two forms of reliance, we can then return to our moral, political, and legal theories that employ the concept of reliance and sort them in light of this distinction, thereby avoiding some ambiguities or equivocations and possibly shedding some light on deep differences between different theories. To that end, at the close of Section Six, in which I introduce and explain the difference between internal and external reliance, I offer one brief example of how just such a project might go.

Before moving on, one caveat is in order. In this paper, I shall work from within a paradigm according to which there are attitudes and norms distinctive to practical reason. This is to be contrasted with so-called "cognitivist" paradigms of practical reason according to which practical reason just is a species of theoretical reason.[14] This is no serious limitation, though, since the arguments presented here can be transposed into a cognitivist key.

2. The Paradigmatic Context of Reliance

It makes little sense to talk of instances of reliance—let us call these *relyings*—outside of the context of someone having some end.[15] And, in particular, it makes little sense to talk of reliance outside of the context of practical reason, by which I mean I mean something fairly broad, namely our capacity to plan, i.e., our capacities to adopt all kinds of ends and then to adopt means in order to achieve those ends.[16] These ends can be as simple as getting a glass of water and as complex as building a company from scratch, and so the means adopted can also be as simple as standing up and walking to the tap or as complex as the innumerable steps involved in starting and building a business. Thus, in any of these cases—from the simplest to the most complex—when we adopt some end, we also adopt and (if all goes well) execute some kind of plan. Standard relyings—the relyings on which I focus in this paper—live only within these plans. In the absence of plans, there would be no relyings, and when an adopted plan is abandoned or completed, the relyings associated with that plan fall away just as do the associated intentions.

For example, suppose I plan to get on Monday morning from New York City to New Haven by a certain time. In the service of completing that plan, I appeal to my beliefs about the means necessary to achieve my goal, such as the belief that in order to get to New Haven, I must take a train that leaves from Grand Central Terminal, and the belief that in order to get to Grand Central Terminal, I must take a subway, etc. Against the background of these means-end beliefs, I form intentions that then fill out the plan: intentions to take a subway to Grand Central Terminal, to buy a one-way, full-fare ticket from the ticket vending machine, to board a train on track 19 that is being advertised as the track on which the next train bound for New Haven is waiting, and to exit the train only when the conductor calls out the New Haven stop. But, my beliefs about means necessary to achieve my end and my intentions to take those means don't quite tell the *whole* story, for my intentions alone are not sufficient for me to get to New Haven. I must rely on the subway not being seriously delayed, I must rely on the ticket vending machine dispensing the correct ticket, I must rely on the accuracy of the signage advertising the location of the next New Haven bound train, I must rely on the train making it to and then stopping in New Haven, and I must rely on the conductor calling out the correct stops as we reach them, to name

just a few things on which I must rely. In short, my plan is shot through with reliance as much as it is shot through with intentions and beliefs.

The scenario just sketched strongly suggests that relyings are beliefs about the future. But they cannot just be beliefs about the future, full stop. For, one can, for example, believe that some distant comet will achieve perihelion in five hundred years without *relying* on the comet achieving perihelion in five hundred years. This belief is not a relying because it plays no role in one's plans. So, if relyings are beliefs, then they are beliefs that play a characteristic role in one's plans, namely they are beliefs that events necessary for success of the plan will occur. Let us call this view the *Simple Belief View of Reliance*.

3. The Simple Belief View of Reliance

Donald enters a dark room that he wants to illuminate. He believes that his flipping a switch will cause the room to be illuminated. So, he decides to flip the switch, he flips the switch, and lo the room is illuminated. Donald's belief that flipping the switch will cause the room to be illuminated was just a plain-Jane belief about the future before he settled on his plan to illuminate the room. But, once he settled on the plan in which the belief was embedded in a characteristic manner, the belief became a relying. Donald's belief is therefore multi-functional: outside of the context of settled practical deliberations about how to act, it functions as a mere belief; within the context of settled practical deliberations about how to act, it functions as a reyling (but also remains a belief all the while).

The chief virtue of the Simple Belief View is that it is simple. First, instead of adding a new mental attitude to the already crowded stable of mental attitudes, it picks out a distinctive role that is played by a very familiar psychological attitude. Consequently, it is also the case that standard epistemic and practical norms will do for assessing the rationality of reliance. This will make the Simple Belief View consistent with most of our standard accounts of practical deliberation. Despite these virtues, the Simple Belief View is too simple to be true. To see why, we must first reflect a moment about different ways in which we can regard some proposition as true.[17]

Suppose late one night I am feverishly trying to complete a paper that is due to the editor the next day, and I realize I need to go to the library to check on some important citations.[18] I do not flat-out believe that the library is open this late (although I do not believe that it is not open); I only dimly, and unconfidently recall seeing a sign at the library advertising that it would be open all night. Nevertheless, because I feel it urgent to get the citations correct, I decide to risk it and to go to the library. So I form a plan: I settle on what materials to bring with me, whether to drive or to ride my bicycle, which route to take, where to go first when I get to the library, etc. I have, then, adopted the propositional attitude of *regarding as true* the proposition that the library is open for the sake of my

practical deliberations. The important feature of this case, though, is that the adoption of this propositional attitude is not regulated primarily by a norm of truth-responsiveness. Instead, *practical* considerations depending upon the broad deliberative context—namely the urgency of my getting the citations correct tonight—recommend my making a plan to go to the library and thereby regarding as true, at least from within the context of my plan, the proposition that the library is open. [19] That is, these 'regarding-as-true' attitudes are adopted in order to meet certain practical demands and not in order to meet any epistemic requirements.[20]

Belief, on the other hand, is regulated truth-responsive norms (for example, the norm might be: if the grounds of the belief make it very likely that p, then believe that p; or if the process by which one comes to believe that p reliably produces true beliefs, then believe that p; or if one bears certain counterfactual relations to the truth of p, then believe that p; and so on[21]) which rule out practical considerations, such as the urgency of achieving some goal, as legitimate grounds for believing that p.[22] That is, belief is shielded from the demands of practical deliberation. This independence of belief from practical considerations is in fact one of the defining features of belief. Consequently, all attitudes that are not independent in this way are not beliefs, even if they involve regarding some proposition as true.[23]

So, if we can rely on something primarily on the basis of practical considerations, then the Simple Belief View fails. In what follows, I argue that we can rely on something primarily on the basis of practical considerations, thereby showing that the Simple Belief View fails. Consider the case in which a stranded sailor's rowboat is about to be dashed by heavy waves onto rocky shoals at the bottom of high white cliffs. Out of the blue a rope is thrown down to the sailor and a voice calls out, "Climb up—I've got the rope secured!" Suppose that the sailor is warranted in believing that the rope is not secured well enough to support him as he climbs up. But, he has stronger confidence in his belief that if he stays in the rowboat, he will die. The sailor also strongly prefers to avoid certain death. So, the sailor decides to climb the rope. As the sailor climbs the rope, he relies on it being secured well enough to hold his weight. He does not, in any normal way of understanding belief, believe the rope will hold his weight since his acceptance of the proposition that the rope is secure is determined entirely by two things: the practical requirements of his plan to climb up the rope to safety and the *absence* of a belief that the rope is *not* secure (i.e., he only has stronger warrant for believing that the rope is not secure than he has for believing that the rope is secure, but he hasn't conclusive reasons for believing that the rope is not secure). This becomes especially clear if we imagine that just as he first grips the rope, another method of saving himself becomes apparent and he chooses to take that method (e.g., he sees an obviously secured chain he could use to climb to safety). Having suddenly abandoned commitment to the rope-climbing plan, his plan-embedded attitude towards the proposition

that the rope is secure is abandoned as well, and he adopts a new attitude: reliance on the chain being secured. Thus, in response to certain practical considerations, the stranded sailor gives up one attitude—reliance on the rope—and adopts a new attitude—reliance on the chain.[24]

My argument here doesn't depend upon our being able to choose directly what we rely upon. Rather it depends upon it being the case that (i) our relyings are determined primarily by both the plans we adopt and the practical considerations associated with the adoption of those plans, (ii) our relyings are only indirectly subject to truth-responsive constraints, and these constraints, insofar as they are operating, are quite weak.[25] In short, whether an agent relies on something depends primarily upon practical considerations and so is not governed primarily by some truth-responsive norm. So, reliance is not a form of belief. We therefore should abandon the Simple Belief View of Reliance.

4. The Acceptance View of Reliance[26]

In the process of arguing against the Simple Belief View, I articulated an alternative account of reliance: reliance just is the propositional attitude of regarding p as true within a practical context, where the attitude, unlike belief, is adopted primarily in response to practical considerations. Michael Bratman dubs this propositional attitude "acceptance in a context."[27] Let us therefore call this view the *Acceptance View of Reliance*.

Consider the following two defining features of acceptance. Although one may accept propositions that one strongly doubts, one ought not accept propositions that one believes to be false. That is, one generally ought not accept that p when one believes that not-p.[28] Doing otherwise may lead to a violation of a basic constraint of practical deliberations, namely that one's intentions ought to fit together with one's beliefs into a consistent account of one's future, and if one accepts a proposition one believes to be false, this will have cascading effects throughout one's deliberations, leading to a deep form of practical inconsistency. Another constraint is that one ought not accept some p as true for no reason. That is, one ought not accept willy-nilly any proposition that one feels like accepting: acceptance is appropriate only in deliberative contexts in which acceptance of the proposition serves some purpose (e.g., conserving cognitive resources, etc.).[29] Upon acceptance, the proposition regarded as true in turn plays a characteristic role in one's practical deliberations, namely it acts as a fixed point with which one's intentions must be consistent. For example, if one accepts that the trains will be running on a holiday schedule today (even if one has 50–50 confidence about the truth of this proposition, i.e., even if one believes only with 50% credence that the trains are running on a holiday schedule today), then there is strong rational pressure not to form a plan that requires intending today to take a train that runs only when the trains run on a regular schedule. These

features of acceptance are very similar to the features of reliance we have recently uncovered. This observation and three further things recommend The Acceptance View: first, it explains why relyings are paradigmatically found within the context of plans, second, it does not fall prey to the main objection suffered by the Simple Belief View, and third, we already have a sophisticated account of acceptance, namely Bratman's account.

Surprisingly, though, we still ought to reject this view because, upon closer inspection, we can see that acceptance and reliance are quite distinct phenomena. First, while relyings may possess some of the features that characterize acceptance, these features are neither the only characteristic features nor even the *identifying* features of reliance. Rather, there are two additional characteristics that make relyings what they are, and mere 'acceptings' do not have these features.

First, relyings are reflexive in a unique way: when A relies on E (where E could be understood as some proposition being true), A thereby *recognizes E as beyond her sphere of agency*, i.e., either as something A cannot control herself or as something over which A has given up control. We can see that relyings have this feature by considering a simple test. What happens if one comes to intend to bring about something upon which one had been relying? The answer: one ceases to rely upon it. For, when an agent intends to make it the case that *p*, she understands herself as having some kind of direct control over whether *p*.[30] But, when an agent relies upon it being the case that *p*, she understands herself as *lacking* direct control over whether that event occurs (this lack of direct control could be due to the fact that the agent relinquished control of that part of the plan, or it could be due to the fact that the agent recognizes that she couldn't possibly control that part of the plan). On the other hand, I might seek to control something on which I previously just relied and so seek to make it so that I can intend to make happen what I had been relying upon happening. For example, suppose that it is unpredictable whether the library will be open late. In this case, I might initially merely rely upon the library being open late but, after finding myself particularly anxious one evening about whether the library is open, I decide no longer to rely upon the library being open and instead I start a campaign of getting the library to regularize and extend its hours on all evenings. Thus, I seek no longer to rely upon the library being open late but instead I seek to make it the case that the library regularly stays open late. Or, suppose I go to a restaurant and order an omelet cooked in olive oil and not butter. I rely on my omelet being cooked in olive oil and not in butter. But, I cease to rely upon my omelet being cooked in olive oil and not in butter if I decide to barge into the kitchen either to oversee the cooking of my omelet or to cook the omelet myself, for in such a case I "take control" of the situation. So, a characteristic feature of reliance is that it involves the relying agent's reflexive awareness of a part of her plan being beyond her control. That is, when one relies on something, one represents to oneself that something will

happen independently of one's intentional action. We might say that reliance involves a kind of implicit recognition of the vulnerability of one's plans to the exigencies of the world.

The second distinctive feature of reliance is that relyings always involve the relying agent's *reflective endorsement* of what she is relying upon. This involves the agent having a fairly robust pro-attitude towards what she is relying upon. This reflective endorsement is inherited from the plan in which the relying is embedded. For, a characteristic feature of plans is that an agent has a stronger commitment to her plans *and their constituents* than she has to other non-planned based pro-attitudes. Bratman pithily puts it this way:

> [Plans] resist reconsideration, and in that sense have inertia; they are conduct controllers, not merely potential conduct influencers; and they provide crucial inputs for further practical reasoning and planning.[31]

So, plans—and the intentions that partially constitute these plans—are not mere pro-attitudes. They are pro-attitudes subject to an important normative constraint, namely that they ought not to be adopted and then simply abandoned. This constraint on reconsideration, reformulation and abandonment is how plans function as fairly rigid and stable contexts for an agent's future practical deliberations. In particular, once an agent has adopted a plan, her future deliberations must—up until a point—yield practical conclusions consistent with the already adopted elements of her plan, as opposed to her plan always being open to revision in light of every passing desire or new opportunity to deliberate. Relyings, because they are creatures of our plans (and are not merely background beliefs), inherit this robust pro-attitude from the plans within which they are embedded, i.e., relyings inherit reflective endorsement from the plans in which they are embedded.

I take this to be a phenomenologically robust feature of reliance. When we rely, we want that relying to be successful and we often feel the tug of that desire. Consider how different this is from belief: it is not the case that by coming to believe something, we thereby come to want to believe it— even if that belief is connected with a plan. If I, for example, adopt the end of getting to New Haven from New York City, and as a consequence of the plan I've adopted to get to New Haven, I come to rely upon the commuter rail running on a regular schedule, I thereby come to want it to be the case that the commuter rail is running on a regular schedule (and I cannot, without suffering some sort of neurosis, just give up this pro-attitude towards the commuter rail running on a regular schedule without changing my plans—this is why it is a robust pro-attitude). If I wasn't relying on the trains running on a regular schedule, though, and I simply believed that the trains are running on a regular schedule, it would be quite odd if, *ceteris paribus*, I wanted it to be the case that the trains are running on a regular schedule. This phenomenological evidence strongly supports the thesis that

relyings inherit reflective endorsement from the plans within which they are embedded.

We have seen, then, that reliance has at least the following two defining features: relyings always involve reflexive acknowledgment of the limits of one's own agency, which has the corollary that relyings are necessarily *de se*, and also relyings are always reflectively endorsed by the relying agent. Acceptance, on the other hand, generally lacks these two features. Let us consider why this is so.

With respect to the first characteristic feature of relyings, standard cases of acceptance neither are necessarily *de se*, nor do they include a representation of something as beyond the sphere of one's agency. For, it's one thing to believe that *p*, it's a further step to believe that whether *p* is beyond the horizons of one's agency. Relyings, on the other hand, involve, at the very least, a kind of implicit recognition of the limits of one's own agency (I leave the specific form of this recognition aside for the time being) and so are also always *de se*.

Second, acceptings might come along with pro-attitudes because such attitudes merely "register"[32] the presence of an associated intention, but they need not involve a pro-attitude towards the truth of the accepted proposition. For, part of one's plan might be to bring it about that the accepted proposition is false. Suppose I am a contractor bidding on project to build a house. In order to make my bid, I must form a plan and that requires identifying a rough estimate of the total cost of the project, the exact amount of which will then guide all my downstream budgeting (so, what I accept is that the total cost will be X, not that the total cost will be some amount less than X, since the latter would not facilitate the exact downstream budgeting required in this project). Let us further suppose there are both very high costs associated with coming in over-budget and very strong incentives to economize so as to come in well under budget. So, in order to avoid the penalties of going over budget I identify the highest unobjectionable cost, X, and then accept for the purposes of planning that it will cost X dollars to build the house. But, because of the incentives to economize, I want it *not* to be the case that it will cost X dollars to build the house. I might even adopt economizing sub-plans that have, as their aim, coming in under budget. So, I clearly do not have a pro-attitude towards it costing X dollars to build the house. But I *accept*, for the sake of planning, that it will cost X dollars to build the house. This is a perfectly regular phenomenon: we all the time accept that *p* while at the same time not wanting it to be the case that *p*, and so aim to make it the case that not-*p*.[33] That is, we can accept that *p* without reflectively endorsing that *p* (or even without wanting that *p*).

This is not the case with reliance: when we rely on that *p*, we want it to be the case that *p*, and so do not aim to make it the case that not-*p*. Additionally, if we did aim to make it the case that not-*p* while relying on that *p*, we would intentionally be taking steps that frustrate our plans instead of realizing those

plans and that would be criticizably irrational. As the house-building case above shows, though, accepting that *p* and taking steps to make it the case that not-*p* is not criticizably irrational. Acceptance, we might say, is no more than a tool for planning. Reliance, on the other hand, is an attitude (or a suite of attitudes) that we take toward our lives as seen from the perspective of our plans and values.

Thus, we have identified two features of reliance that are not present in generic cases of acceptance: a reflexive recognition of the limits of one's agency, and reflective endorsement of the relying. So, the Acceptance View of Reliance ought to be rejected.

5. A Problem: The Reliance Test

Consider the following intuitive test for reliance:

> *The Reliance Test*: If the success of A's plan depends upon the occurrence of E, and if A does not intend to bring E about himself, then A relies on E.

This test easily generates cases of reliance in which the relying agent lacks the conceptual resources necessary to understand propositions about what it is on which she is relying. This threatens the general approach I've been taking, which has been to assume the reliance is a propositional attitude of some sort. For, as a general rule, in order to have an attitude towards some proposition, an agent must at least be able to *entertain* that proposition. But, if an agent lacks the conceptual resources to formulate some proposition, she cannot entertain that proposition, and so she cannot have an attitude towards that proposition. So, there are many cases of reliance that are not propositional attitudes. This threatens my theory of reliance since I have been arguing that, although reliance is not merely a form of belief or acceptance, it does have propositional content.

For example, suppose Mary plans to fly safely from Los Angeles to New York City, but she knows nothing about how planes or airports function. Since Mary knows next to nothing about planes and airports (save the most basic facts such as that planes fly, they take off and land at airports, they sometimes crash, they are flown by pilots, they have seats, etc.), she lacks the conceptual resources with which to form propositional attitudes about how the plane functions and about how the airports to and from which she is flying function. That is to say, she does not possess the concepts necessary to form attitudes of regarding *p* as true, where *p* is, for example, the proposition that the stationary valve plate in the plane's hydraulic system will function properly.[34] But surely Mary is relying on the stationary valve plate functioning properly. After all, if it failed, it would be entirely natural to take it to be the case that something on which Mary was relying failed even though she did not know what it was that failed.[35] So, Mary is relying

on the stationary valve plate functioning properly, but she hasn't even the resources to have propositional attitudes that have this content.

One response I might make here is to say that Mary believes that the plane must function properly so that she can fly safely from Los Angeles to New York City. We can therefore say that she has some attitude toward the proposition that the plane will function properly. Thus, her relying on the plane functioning properly comes along with a propositional attitude. This, though, is not a good route to go. For, it is not the case that by accepting the proposition that the plane will function properly, Mary is *also* accepting propositions about every small part of the plane working.[36] And it will not do to say that Mary accepts only one proposition, namely that everything that contributes to the functioning of the airplane is working. The first option leads to Mary unknowingly having a massive number of propositional attitudes towards propositions about how the plane functions, almost all of which Mary cannot understand since she lacks any grasp of the concepts employed in those propositions. That is absurd and so should be rejected. The second option—accepting only the one proposition that everything will function properly—seems wrong as well. For, it renders unnecessary any substantive theory of reliance: we just rely on one thing all the time, namely that everything will be fine. This don't-worry-be-happy view of reliance, while not obviously absurd, is too ham-fisted and unilluminating and therefore should be rejected.

In sum, the Reliance Test suggests that most relyings are not propositonal attitudes and so poses a significant problem for this approach to understanding reliance. Nonetheless, this challenge can be met by stepping back and taking a more complex view of relyings.

6. External Reliance and Internal Reliance

Since we all are like Mary in that we all know very little about all that is necessary for the realization of our plans, the vast majority of what we rely upon is unknown to us. But, our ignorance does not change what we rely upon; and learning more about the world and one's place in it does not increase the ways in which one relies upon the world; it simply increases what we know. This suggests that we should make a distinction between two kinds of relyings.

One kind of relying is fixed by the Reliance Test. Some mental structures are involved, namely the agent's plan. But, since this kind of reliance depends also upon the success conditions for the agent's plan given the conditions in the actual world, relyings of this form cannot be purely psychological structures. They are instead *relations* between certain mental structures, namely an agent's plans, and the features of the actual world that bear on the success of those plans. Let us call these *external relyings*. To be clear: a propositional attitude may be a relation itself, namely a relation between an agent and a

proposition, but external relyings are relations between propositional attitudes and the world. The closest analogue to this relationship is perhaps the truthmaker relationship, although what is "made" by the external reliance relationship here is not truth but success (of a plan).

Let us now turn to the second form of reliance. These relyings *are* mental structures that have some kind of content—they are "in the head" of the relying agent in the same way that beliefs and intentions are in our heads. Let us call these relyings *internal relyings*. So, what are the content and form of internal relyings? We have already found that the form of internal relyings is much like the form of intentions, in the sense that they are creatures of our plans (or at least our practical deliberations) and they inherit reflective endorsement from the plans in which they are embedded. But, they also are belief-like, in the sense that an agent's internal relyings represent the world as being a certain way. In particular, internal relyings represent the world as the agent takes it to be in light of the execution of an operation like the Reliance Test. Let us call this operation the *Remainder Operation* (I put in the form of a question both for ease of exposition and because I think that we pose the operation to ourselves in the form of a question):

> *The Remainder Operation*: Given my plan, given my beliefs about the world, given my intentions, and given all my other commitments, what are the remaining conditions that are out of my control but are nonetheless necessary for the successful realization of this plan?

This operation, which identifies the success conditions of one's plan which one takes to be beyond the sphere of one's agency, fixes the content of an agent's internal relyings, which are in turn components of the agent's plans.[37]

Since it is the agent's own execution of the Remainder Operation that determines the content of her internal relyings, her internal relyings are subject to her own "theory of the world," as well as her self-understanding, and her capacity to execute the Remainder Operation. If she doesn't understand her own plans and intentions, if she is not sufficiently attentive to her own beliefs about how the world works, or if she lacks the capacity to execute effectively the Remainder Operation, then her internal relyings (and her beliefs about her internal relyings) will reflect that fact. But, insofar as she successfully forms internal relyings, the content of her internal relyings will be fixed by the Remainder Operation and, like her beliefs, intentions, and her qualitative experiences, she will have privileged access to this content, in the sense that there is a distinctive epistemic security in her avowals (public or otherwise) about what she is relying upon.[38]

Internal relyings both represent certain propositions as true (namely the propositions that such-and-such is a necessary condition for the success of one's plan and that this condition is beyond the agent's sphere of agency) and, because they are creatures of an agent's own plans, they express a reflective

endorsement of those propositions. Suppose I plan on getting to New Haven from New York City by lunch-time, and I am internally relying upon the commuter rail running on a regular, non-holiday schedule. I therefore take it to be true, from within the context of my plan, that the commuter rail is running on a non-holiday schedule. This may be false and so my relying can be false in the same way that beliefs can be false. And, I may even have many good reasons to have merely 50% confidence that the trains are running on a non-holiday schedule. But, because I am planning on taking a train to New Haven that runs only on the days when the rail service operates according to the non-holiday schedule, I rely on the trains running on the non-holiday schedule and in so doing flat-out treat this proposition as true from within the context of my plan. Furthermore, that the trains are running on a non-holiday schedule is something to which I am practically committed since, having engaged in the Remainder Operation, I see the success of my plan as depending upon the trains running on a non-holiday schedule. And, this commitment is not truth-apt—it would be like calling a desire for ice cream false. Thus, I both regard it as true that and reflectively endorsement it being the case that the trains are running on a non-holiday schedule.

One might object, as Michael Smith does in "The Humean Theory of Motivation," that one cannot at once have attitudes that are both belief-like and desire-like with respect to the same proposition.[39] Smith argues that

> [A] belief that *p* is a state that tends to go out of existence in the presence of a perception that *not p*, whereas a desire that *p* is a state that tends to endure, disposing the subject in that state to bring it about that *p*.[40]

Thus, a belief that *p* and a desire that *p* cannot co-exist. Smith's argument, though, depends upon cashing out what it is to be desire-like in motivational terms. But, as I have been arguing, reliance is not motivational; it is, in fact, the opposite of being motivational since it involves ceding control over states of affairs.[41] For example, the young man who is a romantic plans for a lifetime of marital and familial bliss with his beloved, even though he has no reason to believe that his beloved has fallen in love or will fall in love with him (he does not have strong reasons to believe that she won't, either!). This romantic feels that the best kind of love to receive is love that one's beloved naturally feels and not love that one wins through effort. So he must rely upon his beloved falling for him and this involves the following: a pro-attitude toward his beloved falling in love with him, a lack of motivation to bring this about (in fact, quite the opposite!), and his regarding as true that his beloved will fall in love with him (how else could he make sense of his own plans that require his beloved falling in love with him?). Thus, we have an attitude (or a suite of attitudes)—internal reliance—that has both belief-like and desire-like properties.

Internal reliance therefore both aims at some kind of accurate represen-
tation of the world and expresses a pro-attitude towards the world being a
certain way. So, internal relyings, like external relyings, exist at a nexus of,
on the one hand, an agent's beliefs and plans, and, on the other hand, the
world. External relyings are facts about this nexus, whereas internal relyings
are representations of this nexus from the point of view of the relying agent.
An agent's internal relyings therefore neatly capture her conception of her
own agential capacities. One's conception of one's own agential capacities is
not just some abstract sense of power but is instead dependent upon one's
theory of the world, one's plans and one's capacity to pull off the Remainder
Operation.

It therefore can be true both that A is relying on F, and that A is not
relying on F. For, the first "relying" can refer to an instance of external
reliance while the second "relying" refers to an instance of internal reliance.
To illustrate, consider the following case:

> Several World Health Organization (WHO) workers travel with polio vaccine
> to a very pious village. The village population does not believe that the WHO
> vaccine will inoculate against polio—only God has the power to do that. The
> WHO workers know that the villagers believe this. So, the workers befriend
> the assistant to the village priest, who convinces the priest to hold a ceremony
> that he announces can prevent the contraction of polio (but only for those who
> participate in the ceremony). At the ceremony, which is long and on a very hot
> day, the assistant gives away liquid refreshments to the participants. The liquid
> she gives away contains the oral polio vaccine. No one but the WHO workers
> and the assistant know about the ruse, although everyone—the WHO workers,
> the assistant, the priest and, most of all, the villagers—wants to the villagers to
> be inoculated against polio.

Here each villager has the goal of becoming immune from suffering polio.
Each villager forms a plan to achieve this goal, and the plans are all built
around, first and foremost, their conceptions of how the world works. The
villagers have rich conceptions of the world as magical, of the priest as having
a unique connection with God, and of his ceremonies as having the capacity
to provoke Godly interventions into bodily states. So, in order to achieve the
end of becoming immune from polio, each villager forms the intention to
attend the ceremony and to do as the priest asks. When each performs the
Remainder Operation, each internally relies on the priest to perform the
ceremony that will inoculate him or her from polio. The villagers' internal
relyings take as their objects certain propositions about what must occur for
successful protection from polio, given their intentions and their theories of
the world. The villagers do not merely accept that these propositions are
true, but take a pro-attitude towards their truth: they want them to be to
true and, if certain conditions pertained, they would do what they could to
make them true by abandoning their relyings and forming certain intentions

(e.g., they might force the priest to perform the ceremony, or one of them might decide to perform his own ceremony because he loses confidence in the priest's ability to communicate with God).

On the other hand, many of their relyings do not pick out what is in fact required for the success of the plan. For, it is not the case that the priest's ceremony can (on its own) prevent anyone from getting polio. Rather, the villagers will be protected from polio only by drinking the refreshments containing effective forms of the oral polio vaccine. Thus, the villagers are *externally relying* upon the proper functioning of both the WHO's oral polio vaccine and the ruse that the WHO workers and the assistant cooked up. That they are not aware of this fact does not change their reliance on the WHO's oral polio vaccine and the ruse; it only reflects a certain lack of knowledge about the conditions of success of their plans.

We can summarize the difference between internal and external reliance by introducing the following neologism: internal reliance involves an agent *incorporating into her plan* reliance on something being the case, whereas external reliance does not. For example, the villagers incorporate into their plans the priest successfully inoculating them through his prayers, whereas the WHO workers do not. We have therefore resolved the challenge posed by the Reliance Test by splitting reliance into two quite distinct phenomena.

Before turning to some suggestive (but inchoate) reflections about norms of reliance, it is worth noting how easy it is, by using this distinction between the two forms of reliance, to see past obvious surface variations and under-stand better at least some of the deeper differences between different moral and political theories. For example, in Thomas Hobbes' argument that in a State of War it is irrational to rely on others, he was concerned with *external reliance*. For, Hobbes' argument that in the State of Nature there could be no industry depends entirely upon the impossibility of the successful external reliance required by industry, *not* on the impossibility of accurate internal reliance. No matter how much you know, if you are in the State of Nature, you cannot successfully create the conditions of commodious living because you cannot (externally) rely on the world being such that plans to create commodious living will work out. Thus, insofar as Hobbes argued that it is irrational in the state of nature to make plans that require reliance on others, he was arguing that there would likely be a *failure of external reliance* and consequently a failure for the plans to be realized.

Contrast this with Thomas Scanlon's account of promising, which has reliance on others at its heart. In this case, Scanlon is concerned with the moral significance of *internal* reliance, and in particular with the reasons associated with the production of a certain kind of psychological attitude in others, namely the psychological attitude of internal reliance. In particular, Scanlon argues (roughly speaking) that a promissory obligation is owed by B to A with respect to E when B successfully elicits A to internally rely on B with respect to E.[42] Thus, Scanlon's discussion of promising shows a

deep sensitivity to the ways in which an agent's conceptions of her planning capacities and of her place in the world are affected by and can be compromised by the actions and attitudes of others. This is especially evident in the fact that *successful* performance of a promise is not of great concern to Scanlon; what matters is that the promiser sincerely *tries* to perform as promised.

So, while it is natural to describe Hobbes and Scanlon as both concerned with reliance, each is focused on rather different phenomena. Hobbes is concerned with securing certain outcomes while Scanlon is concerned with the agent's understanding of herself and her relationship to the world and other agents in that world. This, in turn, might be mobilized to explain further features of their respective theories.

7. Norms of Interal Reliance

Here is a preliminary reflection on possible norms of internal reliance. Internal relyings, because they are entirely psychological attitudes (in the sense that internally relying agents have special access to and control of these attitudes), are subject to a different range of norms. First, it is clear that internal relyings can correctly or incorrectly "track" external relyings, even if they cannot *completely* track external relyings (since this latter would require infinite cognitive capacity). Thus, it seems fair to say that one norm of internal reliance requires that it correctly track external reliance.

What might be behind this demand? Here is one line of argument. I take it to be a constitutive feature of our plans that they are successful due to design and not merely due to luck. This requires that we act as we intend to act and this is up to us—it is entirely internal. Furthermore, it requires that our relyings are successful. And this, in turn, is at least partially up to us. But, whether our relyings are successful depends upon how well our internal reliance matches up with external relying. So, that means that in virtue of being planning agents, we are governed by a norm requiring that (we seek to ensure that) our internal and external relyings match up.

Another requirement of internal reliance may be that internal relyings are appropriately coherent with respect to the other parts of the plan in which they are embedded. For example, the villagers in the WHO case may be externally relying on the polio vaccine working. But, if their internal relyings reflected this even while no other components of their plans reflected this, that would make no sense at all. We can conclude that there are particular practical constraints on internal reliance that follow from the norms governing planning agency.

Finally, internal relyings must bear some epistemic warranting relationship to the relying agent's background beliefs. The required relationship could be a weak one (e.g., a requirement that there are not too many inconsistencies between beliefs and relyings) or it could be a strong one

(e.g., a requirement that all relyings must have some background beliefs providing positive warrant for them).[43] I am inclined towards weaker rather than stronger requirements, but I shall not argue for that here.

8. Internal and External Reliance in Moral and Political Theory

Although it is far beyond the scope of this paper to explore how this novel theory of reliance might play a role in political or moral theorizing, it may be worthwhile to offer some preliminary comments.

External relyings are relations that exist between an agent's plans and the world outside her plans. One might think that we could apply moral principles to determine whether any particular case of external reliance is permissible. For example, if an external reliance relation involves a net decrease in overall, average, or some other utility function, it might be an impermissible relation. This sort of sentiment lies behind some objectivist positions in ethics.

This view might also be found in political philosophy. Some have argued that in some schemes of social and economic cooperation, either cooperative success or the extent of surplus value generated due to cooperative success requires some cooperating parties to rely upon the immiseration of other cooperating parties but without the awareness of many or any of the cooperative parties. Such forms of external reliance are morally objectionable, even if no one is aware of them. For example, Marx argued that the success of capitalism depended upon the immiseration of the proletariat. But, he also argued that for capitalism to function, the proletariat's and the capitalists' understanding of the fact that the success of capitalism depended upon the immiseration of the proletariat had to be occluded by a particularly stubborn form of false consciousness. The false consciousness provides a kind of conceptual stumbling block, preventing the acquisition by the capitalist and the proletariat of the concepts necessary to comprehend the external reliance relations in which they find themselves.

Similar arguments, but without the appeals to false consciousness, have recently been developed by those who wish to defend a theory of global justice by appeal to Rawlsian principles.[44] According to these arguments, global schemes of cooperation depend upon reliance relations existing between states or individuals. Because these instances of reliance exist in virtue of a global scheme of cooperation, certain reciprocity requirements are in effect, and they militate against these instances of reliance having a certain form, namely a form in which goods that exist in virtue of the cooperative scheme are unfairly distributed. In these theories, what is being identified are instances of external reliance—the well-off persons' external reliance upon the global poor bearing a large share of the burdens of the global scheme of cooperation but receiving a tiny share of the benefits of the global scheme of cooperation—that are then subjected to moral scrutiny. Whether

anyone actually represents himself as being in such reliance relations is beside the point: the reliance relations are immoral *qua* relations of external reliance.[45]

These sorts of moral and political views should be distinguished from theories according to which the moral status of a state of affairs, or more particularly some political order, requires a determinate form of self-understanding with respect to that political order. For example, many hold that consent is necessary for legitimate political authority. But, most hold that the morally significant form of consent is inherently reflexive in that, at least for reasonably aware and rational adults, one cannot consent to something without being aware of the fact that one has done so. Thus, in many cases morally meaningful consent to a political authority involves *internal* reliance on that political authority acting in such and such a way. This significance of internal reliance becomes even more obvious in cases in which *recognition* plays a central role in a political theory.[46] According to these views, legitimacy, to put it very roughly, depends partially upon persons recognizing themselves in the political institutions to which they are subject. For example, a subject must not be alienated from the policies of the state in the sense that the subject cannot possibly see himself as adopting such a policy for himself. Importantly, it does not matter if the subject *in fact* adopts such policies or if the state says that it is going to adopt such a policy but in fact fails to do so. All that matters is that the subject understands himself and his relation to the state in a certain manner, where that understanding needn't track the truth.

Finally, as suggested by the brief recapitulation of Scanlon's theory of promising, our internal relyings may also be subject to moral judgment. Sometimes, it is morally required that one intend to bring something about rather than to rely on it happening. This is, for example, often the case when we make promises. There are other cases as well. For example, one ought not constantly make plans that prompt one to rely on one's friends being charitable, especially when one has good reason to believe that one's friends are inclined to be very charitable in such situations. For, that creates conditions in which one exploits one's friends' good characters. Similarly, children must learn not to rely upon their parents getting things done for them even when they know that their parents will do certain things for them. Thus, we can conclude that there are moral norms governing internal reliance.

There are probably tensions between the demands of these norms. It may be the case that it is impossible to meet the requirements of all three all the time. Or there may be some way of ranking the norms that would allow an agent not to fall short. Addressing this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. I only mean to highlight the issue so as to give a slightly fuller picture of the two forms of reliance and to identify an avenue of inquiry that may be worth exploring in the future.

9. Conclusion

In this paper, I've attempted to develop a novel theory of reliance. I have argued that there are two forms of reliance, external and internal reliance, and that the latter has both desire-like and belief-like components. At least four interesting consequences follow. First, because internal reliance has both conative and cognitive features, internal reliance cannot be reduced either to mere belief or Bratmanian acceptance-in-a-context, even if it might be reducible to a constellation of beliefs and desires (i.e., reliance might be a *molecular* psychological attitude). So, even if intentions are just desires of a certain sort[47] or special reflexive beliefs,[48] at least one component of our psychology—reliance—is either a hybrid psychological attitude (this would be the most radical claim) or a molecular attitude reducible to more familiar parts (this is the least radical claim).

Second, internal reliance turns out to be the psychological state that most vividly represents a person's conception of herself as a practical agent who is nonetheless subject to the exigencies of an external world. Reliance is, in a sense, the state that captures simultaneously the agent's subjective and objective perspectives of herself.[49]

Third, we might benefit by re-visiting political, ethical and legal theories that employ the concept of reliance, so that we can determine the relevant form of reliance employed by each theory (or whether there have been equivocations).

Fourth, this theory of reliance provides a powerful tool for cashing out the practical structure of interpersonal relationships beyond theories of shared activity or joint planning, since a defining feature of interpersonal relationships is interpersonal reliance *outside* the context of planning.

Notes

[1] I thank Zoltan Szabo, Michael Della Rocca, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Troy Cross, Barbara Sattler, David Owens, David Miller, an anonymous referee for *Noûs*, and especially Nishi Shah and Kieran Setiya for valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

[2] Thomas Hobbes (1651/1968) *Leviathan*, C.B. Macpherson, ed. (NYC: Penguin Books), Chapter 13, paragraph 9 (p. 186).

[3] See John Rawls (1999) *A Theory of Justice*, 2nd Edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), Part One.

[4] See Thomas Scanlon (1999) *What We Owe to Each Other* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Presss), chapter 7. The classic Humean and Rawlsian "practice" accounts of promising also ground promissory obligation in reliance, but via the way that a practice of promising ensures reliance on others and therefore facilitates the production of a valuable surplus. See David Hume (2000) *Treatise of Human Nature*, Norton and Norton, eds. (NYC: Cambridge University Press), pp. 331–337 (section 3.2.5) and Rawls (1999), pp. 301–308.

[5] See especially Annette Baier, "Trust and Antitrust" reprinted in Annette Baier (1994) *Moral Prejudices* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), chapter 6, and Richard Holton in Holton (1994) "Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe" 72 *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 1, pp. 63–76, who both analyze trust as a form of reliance.

[6] See, e.g., Bernard Williams, "Moral Luck" in Bernard Williams (1981) *Moral Luck* (NYC: Cambridge University Press), pp. 20–39.

[7] Reliance damages are damages that, when paid by the breaching party to the injured party, are supposed to return the injured party to the position he would have been in had he not contracted with the breaching party. A subject of debate is whether the appropriate remedy for breach of contract is payment of reliance damages, or payment of expectation damages, or specific performance. See, e.g., Lon Fuller and William Perdue (1936) "The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages" 46 *Yale Law Journal* 1, pp. 52–96, Charles Fried (1981) *Contract as Promise* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) and Seana Valentine Schiffrin (2007) "The Divergence of Contract and Promise" 110 *Harvard Law Review* 3, pp. 708–753.

[8] For a book-length discussion of the ancient's appreciation of the fact of reliance, see Martha Nussbaum, *Fragility of Goodness* (1986) *The Fragility of Goodness* (NYC: Cambridge University Press). Aristotle argues in *The Nicomachean Ethics* that "...there is required [for happiness]...not only complete excellence but also a complete life, since many changes occur in life, and all manner of chances, and the most prosperous may fall into great misfortunes in old age, as is told of Priam in the Trojan Cycle; and one who has experienced such chances and has ended wretchedly no one calls happy." (1100a4–9) Translation from W.D. Ross, revised by J.O. Urmson, found in *The Complete Works of Aristotle Volume 2*, Jonathan Barnes, ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 1738.

[9] There is a massive literature on *presupposition* in a linguistic, primarily conversational, context. According to Robert Stalnaker's very influential account, presupposition might be understood in terms of a speaker's reliance on a hearer's believing certain propositions. But, the fact of reliance is a fact about our activities extending beyond conversational contexts. So, a theory of reliance might plausibly rule out certain theories of presupposition. I have therefore attempted to keep the theory of reliance defended in this paper largely consistent with Stalnaker's theory of pragmatic presupposition, on the assumption that presupposition is a purely cognitive and linguistic cousin of the practical form of reliance explored in this essay. See, e.g., Robert Stalnaker (1973) "Presuppositions" 2 *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 447–457.

[10] For example, a theory of intentional action is crucial to making sense of responsibility, and a theory of knowledge—or at least theories of evidence and other grounds for belief—play important roles in legal theory.

[11] See Michael Bratman, "Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context" in Michael Bratman (1999) *Faces of Intention* (NYC: Cambridge University Press), pp. 15–34.

[12] I draw inspiration from Michael Bratman's distinction between internal and external norms governing intention, discussed in Michael Bratman (1987) *Intention, Plans and Practical Reason* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), pp. 109ff.

[13] Reliance is not reliability. Reliability is a characteristic that someone or some phenomena have that make them the sort of things on which people can rationally rely. In particular, by calling a person reliable, we usually mean that she will do what she sincerely says she will do as a matter of character. When we say that some type of phenomenon is reliable, we usually mean that tokens of that phenomenon are realized regularly or with some regularity.

[14] For a classic statement see Gilbert Harman, "Practical Reasoning," reprinted in Gilbert Harman (1999) *Reasoning, Meaning and Truth* (NYC: Oxford University Press), pp. 46–74. For more moderate positions, see R. Jay Wallace (2001) "Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reasoning?" 1 *Philosopher's Imprint* 3, pp. 1–26, David Velleman, *Practical Reflection* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), and Kieran Setiya (2003) "Explaining Action," 112 *Philosophical Review* 3, pp. 339–393. For a recent defense of a non-reductive account of practical rationality, see Michael Bratman, "Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical" in Simon Robertson (2009) *Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity* (NYC: Oxford University Press).

[15] There is an important way in which both our beliefs and our knowledge rely on warranting grounds, whatever those might be. That is, there seems to be some form of *epistemic*

reliance. Whether this form of reliance is of the same sort as the reliance to which I am attending is an interesting question, but one I put aside here. I put it aside because my concern the role reliance has played in moral, political, and legal philosophy, and in these arenas, reliance is always connected with practical reason. For more on the epistemic form of reliance, see Keith Lehrer (1997) *Self Trust* (NYC: Oxford University Press).

[16] I therefore follow Bratman's powerful strategy in Bratman (1987).

[17] What follows in the next two paragraphs is a very quick summary of the central points of Michael Bratman, "Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context" in Michael Bratman (1999) *Faces of Intention* (NYC: Cambridge University Press), pp. 15–34.

[18] For those unconvinced by this example, consider the act of giving a *reductio*: the argument-maker, who believes that not-*p*, must accept as true that *p* in order to derive a contradiction. I thank Zoltan Szabo for reminding me of this example.

[19] This is not to say that these norms are truth-unresponsive since if I have conclusive grounds to regard as *false* the proposition that the library is open, it would be irrational for me to treat that proposition as true within the context of my deliberations. Nonetheless, I might from outside the context of the plan, believe with 75% confidence that the library is *not* open. But, once I start planning to go to the library, I, from within the context of the plan, flat-out accept as true the proposition that the library is open. If I don't, then my planning to go to the library would be almost unintelligible: why would I be riding my bike to the library if I do not accept as true the proposition that the library is open?

[20] The attitude is regulated by at least one epistemic norm: if the agent knows that p is false, then it would be deeply irrational for the agent to regard *p* to be true within a deliberative context. This should not be taken to be some sort of contextualism: it is not the case that in some urgent deliberative contexts, I know that the library is open, but when the context is not urgent I do not know. The point I make here has nothing to do with knowledge or knowledge ascription. I am claiming only that I regard some propositions as true because of the deliberative context requires that I do so. I need not take myself to know such propositions nor do I assume that anyone would ascribe me knowledge of such propositions. For a canonical paper on contextualism, see Keith DeRose (1992) "Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions," 52 *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 4, pp. 913–929.

[21] I do not mean to suggest that the norms governing belief must take the form of a conditional, although this is ultimately immaterial since I think that the norms of belief, insofar as they are propositional, are best understood as reconstructions of underlying non-propositional psychological dispositions.

[22] See Anscombe, *Intention*, p. 56, Bernard Williams, "Deciding to Believe," in Bernard Williams (1973) *Problems of the Self* (NYC: Cambridge University Press), pp. 135–51, Mark Platts (1979) *Ways of Meaning* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul), p. 257, Michael Smith (1987) "The Humean Theory of Motivation," 96 *Mind*, pp. 36–61, David Velleman (2000) "On the Aim of Belief" in David Velleman (2000) *In The Possibility of Practical Reason* (NYC: Oxford University Press), pp. 244–81, Ralph Wedgwood (2002) "The Aim of Belief" 16 *Philosophical Perspectives*, pp. 267–297, and Nishi Shah (2003) "How Truth Governs Belief," 112 *Philosophical Review*, pp. 447–82. For a general discussion of direction-of-fit, i.e., how belief has a distinctive normative relationship with truth, see Lloyd Humberstone (1992) "Direction of Fit" 101 *Mind*, pp. 52–83.

[23] The point here is that no matter how much I care about believing something, I cannot will myself to believe it in the same way I can decide to stand up. Pascal's fear of hell might be a consideration in favor of taking steps that he believes will cause him to believe in God. So, out of fear he decides to go to church, to bend his knee and pray, and to proclaim his belief in Christ. In the deliberative context, e.g., when planning his prayers, Pascal might accept that God exists for the purposes of planning his prayers and devotions, but this is not the same as believing in God (if only it were that easy!). Of course, if Pascal gets into the habit of praying, he might find himself getting into the habit of believing in God. This is an interesting

phenomenon and well worth independent reflection. For contemporary discussion of what some call 'pragmatic encroachment,' See Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath (2002) "Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification" 111 *Philosophical Review*, pp. 67–94, John Hawthorne (2004) *Knowledge and Lotteries* (NYC: Oxford University Press), Jason Stanley (2005) *Knowledge and Practical Interests* (NYC: Oxford University Press), and Brian Weatherson (2005) "Can We Do Without Pragmatic Encroachment?" 19 *Philosophical Perspectives* 1, pp. 417–443.

[24] Those unconvinced might consider this second example. Suppose an Army private is ordered by his sergeant to execute a complex plan involving charging up a hill towards an enemy position. The first step of the plan is to make complex preparations for setting up a post at the top of the hill once the charge is complete. The Army private has strong but inconclusive reasons to believe that he will die with the initial charge and never make it to the top of the hill. But, he adopts and begins to execute the complex plan he is ordered to adopt. We can make sense of this only if the private, accepting the practical authority of his sergeant, adopts the plan and thereby comes to rely upon his surviving the initial charge. Otherwise, his initial preparations are senseless. Adopting a plan, we might say, creates limited-scope second-order exclusionary reasons to rely upon certain things being the case. Beliefs, because they are governed solely by epistemic norms, which require consideration of dependent reasons, are therefore not responsive to exclusionary reasons, which block consideration of dependent reasons. Is belief on the basis of expert testimony a counterexample? It is not: expert testimony is transparent with respect to dependent reasons. For the full range of this debate, see the essays in Jennifer Lackey, ed. (2006) *The Epistemology of Testimony* (NYC: OUP).

[25] It is indirect because what is required is that the relying not conflict with any beliefs, and these beliefs are what are truth-responsive. This requirement is itself weak: it can be disregarded in several cases, most notably the case of giving a *reductio* where one assumes the truth of a premise in order to prove that it is false.

[26] This section benefited from discussion with Nishi Shah.

[27] See Bratman (1990).

[28] The exception, as noted, is accepting as true some premise for the purposes of a *reductio*.

[29] For the full list, see Bratman (1999), pp. 21–26.

[30] See Velleman (1989).

[31] *Id.*

[32] I owe this way of putting this point to an anonymous referee.

[33] Here are a few more examples. Example 1: Suppose I am planning a dinner party. For the sake of planning, I accept that everything will be ready to serve at 8:00 PM. I make many sub-plans on the basis of accepting that *p*: I tell my guests to arrive at 8:00 PM, I plan baking so that items will be coming out of the oven timed in a way that will fit best with dinner beginning at 8:00 PM, etc. But, I also prefer to have some time to relax prior to the guests' arrival. So, I want it to be the case that the dinner will be ready to be served prior to 8:00 PM. Example 2: Suppose I am planning with friends on getting to a dinner party by 8:00 PM. I accept for the sake of joint planning that we will arrive at the dinner party at 8:00 PM. But, I enjoy arriving for dinner parties early so I can explore the neighborhood a bit prior to entering the dinner party. So, I want to arrive 15 minutes early.

[34] This is not simply a matter of knowing *words*, as in what to call the small, complex parts of the hydraulic system or what to call it when those parts are working properly. It is a matter of not even being aware that those parts exist or that they have any function at all.

[35] I am assuming that it is often natural to view reliance as going across both identity *and* constitution. Thus, if George, who was alive when *Waverly* was published, does not believe that Scott is the author of *Waverly*, it is still the case that if George relies on Scott, he also relies on the author of *Waverly*. Additionally, if Susanne does not believe that her car has spark plugs, a fuel-injection system, pistons, etc., (e.g., because she does not know what these things are), if she relies on her car functioning, she thereby relies on all these things functioning. But, if one wishes to reject either of these claims, I can accommodate that with other examples that do not

depend for their plausibility on reliance operating across identity or constitution (see, e.g., the WHO example in Section 6 below).

[36] It might be the case that she believes of the stationary valve plate that it is working. Here, though, one would need a pretty liberal theory for *de re* beliefs. In general, *acceptance* does not run across identity or constitution for familiar reasons associated with substitution in opaque contexts.

[37] It is worth noting that one might have false beliefs about one's plans, i.e., the belief that one has a plan when one does not in fact have a plan. Would one thereby come to have internal relyings without plans (and also without the reflective endorsement characteristic of internal relyings)? No. If one has false beliefs about one's intentions, one does not thereby come to have those intentions. Similarly, one can have false beliefs about one's internal relyings without generating actual internal relyings. What this highlights is that performing the Remainder Operation only fixes the *content* of one's relyings; performing the Remainder Operation does not *generate* relyings. Whether one actually is internally relying on something depends on other factors as well, most importantly whether one actually has a plan in which that internal relying is embedded. I thank an anonymous referee for pushing for clarity on this point.

[38] As mentioned above, the agent could be wrong about her internal relyings. All I am saying here is that she has privileged access to is the content of the internal relyings she thinks she has. This access lends a distinctive epistemic security to her sincere avowals about the content of both her actual internal relyings and her imagined internal relyings. For a nice overview of the issues involved in self-knowledge see Dorit Bar-On, *Speaking My Mind* (NYC: Oxford University Press, 2004), especially the Introduction.

[39] See Smith (1987).

[40] Smith (1987), p. 54.

[41] On the other hand, on my picture of reliance, it is true that if there is any motivation associated with reliance, it is a disposition to reconsider relying in favor of intending if certain conditions are (or are not) met—i.e., if one perceives that *not-p*. Kieran Setiya in Kieran Setiya (2007) *Reasons Without Rationalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), pp. 49–51, disputes Smith's position on similar grounds.

[42] See Thomas Scanlon (1999), chapter 7.

[43] If there is a valid principle of epistemic closure, then that would have some bearing on the epistemic norms governing internal reliance.

[44] See esp. Thomas Pogge (1989) *Realizing Rawls* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press) and Charles Beitz (1999) *Political Theory and International Relations*, 2nd Edition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

[45] Just to be clear here: For Marx, the external reliance relation *explains* the immiseration of the proletariat in the sense of there being a kind of counterfactual dependence, while for the Rawlsians the fact that there is such an external reliance relation is what makes the distribution unjust, even if there is no counterfactual dependence between the external reliance and the distribution.

[46] See, e.g., Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition" in his *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, Amy Gutmann, ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992): 2–74; and Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, Joel Anderson, trans. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).

[47] See, e.g., Michael Ridge (1998) "Humean Intentions," 35 *American Philosophical Quarterly* 2, pp. 157–178.

[48] See, e.g., David Velleman (1989) and Kieran Setiya (2003).

[49] For more, see Thomas Nagel (1986) *The View From Nowhere* (NYC: Oxford University Press), pp. 25–27, 54–66, 113–120.